The FRONTLINE Interviews

Nikolay Petrov

Russian political scientist

Nikolay Petrov is a political scientist and professor at the Higher School of Economics at National Research University in Moscow.

This is the transcript of an interview with FRONTLINE's Michael Kirk conducted on July 11, 2017. It has been edited in parts for clarity and length.

This interview appears in:

Putin’s Road to War

The Putin Files

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Putin's Political Rise

Let’s start with the apartment bombings in Moscow back in the late ’90s.Putin, is he prime minister or head of FSB [Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation] at the time?

He was prime minister at the time.

Prime minister.What's the political problem for somebody who’s prime minister when such a catastrophe occurs?

I think that not only Putin was prime minister at that time, but he was considered to be the probable Yeltsin successor, or it [had been] announced by Yeltsin.And his [Putin's] problem at that time was lack of recognition.He was absolutely unknown to the general public, and Yeltsin was extremely unpopular.The general vision at that time was that Yeltsin's saying that Putin should inherit his position was like kiss of death, and there were no chances for Putin to increase his popularity.

These explosions did change entirely the whole atmosphere on the eve of parliamentary elections.The whole program, which was developed by Yevgeny Primakov, [who] became a candidate to the president, lost its sense, because nobody was thinking about how to improve economy.Everybody, at least here in Moscow, was focused on how to save his or her life.That's why problems of safety overshadow[ed] any economic considerations.

Putin is not known as a general, military general, by any stretch of the imagination, [but he] throws himself at the problem.And as I understand it, he builds a sort of reputation as somebody who took on the Chechnya problem head-on and made some improvements?

First of all, it was a good chance for Putin, who was not connected with security—even as the head of FSB, he was a political appointee, and he was not well-accepted by high-ranking officials there.But the Russian society at that time considered Putin as a guy from KGB who can provide for security.

He looked as a very decisive guy, unlike Yeltsin.¹

It was all the time [a] comparison with Yeltsin, and Putin was winning in this comparison because he was much younger.He didn't drink. He was a sportsman.He was very decisive, and he could take responsibility for different things, including for the second war in Chechnya, which was going on.

So he gets in.The stories people tell us about Russia during the first attempt at democracy and the Yeltsin administration are a little desperate at the time, financially and otherwise, not to mention the security issues.What does Putin do that his popularity seems to rise so dramatically after his election and in those first couple of years?

First of all, Putin did exploit this image, who came after the old President Yeltsin, who got extremely unpopular.In many different ways, Putin was an opposite to Yeltsin.A little bit later, the economy did start to grow due to oil and gas prices climbing up.Not only these, but in general, it was time for certain economic improvements due to the results of [the] 1998 economic crisis.The ruble went down, and it did create good opportunities for domestic business.And when these opportunities [were] exhausted, oil and gas did contribute a lot.

I think that initially, Putin was trying to create the image of the guy who did create this positive economic development.A little later, he himself did believe that it was due to his personal role. …

Then there are a number of things that happen that are challenges in the country and in the region.The color revolutions, the Orange and Rose Revolution, the fact that America doesn’t agree with Putin and attacks Iraq, other things.That effort for prestige, that effort for respect and other problems seem to be getting in his way.What is the reaction of the typical Russian to what is happening internationally and on the borders?

In my view, the most important event at that time was 9/11.As you know, Putin's reaction was immediate, and it was pretty much positive.He was almost alone at the meeting he gathered, who was supporting the idea to improve relations with the United States and to offer cooperation.At that time, a majority of freshmen political elites, almost all of them, are against this term in Russia's relations with the West and with the United States in particular.But I do remember reaction here on to what has happened in the United States, and it was like it happened to part of our world, perhaps the most important, the most influential part of our world, and it was taken very personally by a majority of Russians.Putin's move at that time was, I think, strongly supported by Russians.

In the case of political elites, I think the idea was that when offering this cooperation to the United States, they should get something in exchange.When it didn't happen, elites got disappointed, and it was partly the reason why we have seen the move in opposite direction in a while.

What were they hoping would come from the rapprochement with the United States?

I think at that time, the idea of Putin and of Russian political elites was to show that they were in Chechnya, which was going on, as the same war against terror and against radical Islamists, and Russia and the United States should feel like during the Second World War being allies against terrorists.The idea was the United States should support Moscow, should support Russia in its war against Chechnya at that time. It didn't happen. …

It’s an interesting time for him and Russia.How important was it to him in ’05, ’06, heading into ’07 to have been victorious in terms of his appeal to the Russian people, been victorious in the struggle to get respect from the United States and the West?

I think it’s very important to him, and it’s very important to his image, because, especially now when his legitimacy is—legitimacy of a chieftain, of the leader who did prove to the West that Russia is great, it’s back and so on, that's why his reaction onto anything which can [be] considered as a sign of humiliation can be furious.His whole image depends on demonstration of respect toward him from the West, from the world leaders.I think that the reason of this huge difference between Putin in early 2000 and Putin when he delivered his speech in Munich [in 2007] is partly connected to the fact that initially Russia used to be much weaker than it appeared to be in the second half of the zero years [2000s].

Second, Putin did count on improving relations with the West, but his point was that Russia should be not treated as a junior partner; it should be treated as equal.When it didn’t happen this way, he got disappointed, and we've seen his reaction to the fact that his plans, his illusions, they are not realized in full. …

Putin Consolidates Power in his Second Term

…He comes in following Yeltsin, put in, not a guy who has a great reputation, not a guy who was much more than a former KGB guy who worked for [Mayor of St. Petersburg Anatoly] Sobchak for a while.But suddenly, he's run up the ladder in a span of about six years, and he’s president of Russia.He inherits a lot of oil, so with the price of oil going up, he’s got something going for him there.But he really is viewed as a bureaucrat until this moment [the Munich speech], I suppose?

I think that something has changed in his own mentality as well, perhaps.He came to inherit what Yeltsin had left to him.During his first term, he was just doing what had been developed in depth [by] the presidential staff, and here we can say that Putin continued Yeltsin's course in general.Well, there were some exceptions, but in general he was moving the same way.

But when Russia became much wealthier, and Putin [came to] believe that it was due to his skillful management and due to his personal abilities, I think that he himself did believe in his special nation and in his ability to lead the country.What is important, even more I think, is the fact that after those reforms, the second wave of reforms, which were worked out by liberal economists in 2004 and which should [have been] realized at the beginning of the second Putin presidential term, they caused huge popular unrest because they were not very well developed.They were not very well balanced, and they’ve been realized poorly.That was the reason for reforms to be postponed initially and later to be canceled at all.

I think that it was a very important moment in Putin's life when he understood, or he thought that he did understand, that when experts, including the most trusted ones, are coming to him to say that without reforms, the country cannot survive, it's vitally needed and so on, and finally it appeared, according to him, that they were wrong and he was right, I think that since that time, he believes that his situation is much more important than anything any trustful experts can say to him.He makes decisions based on his own intuition more than on what experts are saying to him.

And the authoritarianism, the consolidation of power, the taking over the media, the moving of some oligarchs away and a different kind of oligarch taking over, all of that is happening in that first seven years as well.By design or inclination or exigency?

I don't believe in a master plan realized step by step.Until recently, I did not believe in Putin as a strategist.In my view, he is a brilliant tactician who can overplay almost everybody, including Western leaders.But it looks like in some cases, and this is exactly this case, his moves, which cannot be planned initially as elements of the same strategy, are leading to certain strategic goals.… <v Michael Kirk> If I ask you to describe or define Putinism, what is Putinism?To speak about the current Russian personalistic political regime, it’s a kind of sultanism where there is a czar who came to power 17 years ago and who does not depend a lot [on] political elites, whose legitimacy is based on his personal popularity.That's why Putin depends much less [on] political elites starting from 2014, but political elites depend [on] Putin much more.It’s possible to see that the country is a hostage of the political regime, but the political regime is a hostage of Putin.Unfortunately, perhaps for Putin, he himself is a hostage of those decisions and those moves he made. …

The Reset and Arab Spring: Putin as Prime Minister

So into that environment, [with Putin now as prime minister], factor in the rolling effect of the Arab Spring.Uprisings in Egypt and many other countries all the way up to Libya, they're all happening.There's a certain churn in the world, maybe caused by the United States if you believe Mr. Putin's fear.But under any circumstances, change feels like it's in the air by the time you have protests here in 2011 and 2012, especially around the idea, the announcement, that they [Dmitry Medvedev and Putin] are going to change jobs, and Putin will be president again.

There are different explanations [for] why Putin did finally decide to come back.One of these explanations is that the Arab Spring happened and Putin understood that the country should be controlled by much more decisive rule than Medvedev was [providing].… And I think this is, by the way, a very understandable limitation of Putin's view of the world.He came from secret services, and he does not believe that something can happen without somebody’s good or bad will.

So if it wasn’t him [organizing] something, then it [w]ould be something else, including the State Department.I would take his words as much more sincere than usually they are taken.When he’s speaking about the State Department conspiracy in the case of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and so on, I think this is his own belief.His reaction on Muammar Qaddafi’s death was furious as well because in his view, it was demonstration of the fact that if any leader is showing his weakness, including in relations with the West, he is not getting any kind of mercy, and he can be killed without keeping certain rules of the game.

I think since that time, his idea is that he should never count on somebody’s goodwill, and he should keep being the strongest.He should play with the West from the position of strength rather than from the position of weakness. …

Putin Asserts Himself on the World Stage in his Third Term

So how different was he after he gets re-elected?

I think that the turning point was [the] May 6 protest on Bolotnaya, because it looked for the Kremlin that if elections are over, there are no reasons for political protests because it’s decided.And they did win almost honestly.The elections are not fair because Putin himself did define who should run against him, but elections were more or less free in terms of fraud, which was of less scale than half a year before at a time of parliamentary elections.

And all of a sudden, they saw crowds on the street, which meant that in spite of winning in presidential elections, Putin did not manage to improve his electoral legitimacy and the legitimacy crisis which was going on since Putin did declare that he should be back, was going on and was developing.And that's why something should be made.

I think it was that time when the decision to confront with the West, to close the country to certain extent, and to switch from electoral to chieftains legitimacy appeared first in his mind.Since May 2012 we [have seen] that [more and more] pressure was put onto political elites to control them and not to let them to split.

In 2014, it took the shape of what had happened in the Ukrainian case.So in my view, it was almost for sure that confrontation with the West should take place.It could take a different shape.It could happen without Ukraine; it could happen without Crimea.But it was deadly [sic] needed for the political regime to restore Putin's legitimacy and to keep in power. …

… He has the television networks; he has all the means of communication available to him.So what's he doing with all of that?

I think that during his first year when coming to power, Putin, especially after the Kursk submarine case, when it appeared that Putin looked in a very weak position due to media coverage which was not entirely controlled by him, since that time, he invested a lot of efforts in order to control the information space entirely, either by means of the state television or by means of TV channels controlled by his comrades in arms.… We should not underestimate the fact that although Russia in general can be seen in economic terms as much weaker than European Union or the United States or the West, it can concentrate huge resources almost immediately.That's why in terms of military campaign or information war campaign, it can be used to Russia's favor, and it can lead to Russia's victory or at least Russia's strong position vis-à-vis the West.

I think all these factors working together should be taken into account when we are trying to estimate efficiency of this propagandist machine.In Russia's case, in the case of domestic audience, there is nothing else.So partly it’s like Putin's case.When being asked whether Putin is the most influential politician in the country, I think the real majority of Russians are answering yes, he is, because there are no other politicians in the country at all.

So the same is with this information machine.It’s influential not that much due to very skillful work, but due to its presence everywhere and due to the fact that there is nothing else except for this information machine.

When Sochi is happening, and the publicity is extremely positive, and the world seems to be paying close attention, there's also trouble in Ukraine.He gets through the Olympics, but then the other side of Putin has to come out; the bad story about Russia has to hit the airwaves. Tell me about that.

I think that at the end of the day, Putin's idea was that the West, inspiring all the events in Ukraine, did steal his glorious victory in Sochi Olympics because it happened just at the end of Sochi Olympics.And instead of celebrating Russia's glorious showing there, everybody was speaking about Kiev, about Ukrainian events and so on.Perhaps due to this, his reaction was so rapid and so furious. …

And what does he do?

What did he do? He decided to show the West his other face.If you are not well-accepting [of] his human face, you should look at his [other] face as [that] of a strong and cruel leader.If you cannot make a deal on his conditions, then he should not play by your rules of the game, and he should, or he can, violate these rules of the game.

If it’s possible for the United States to violate certain rules of the game if needed, Putin is absolutely sure that he is in his own right to violate these rules of the game as well, and now you should react.I think partly it can be explained by his childhood spent in a kind of criminal, poor neighborhood of Leningrad, where decisiveness was a very important element of your behavior.Being confronted by any threat, you should be even more decisive than you could [ordinarily be].You should demonstrate your willingness to go to the end and to use any means.

So he pulls out all of the strategic things available to him, tactical things available to him—hard power, takes the insignias off the uniforms.He does an information campaign. There's a cyberattack associated with Ukraine.He's fully locked and loaded, ready to go when it comes time to do what he has to do in Crimea and Ukraine, I take it?

Absolutely.And we should take into account that unlike any other world leader, perhaps except for [Turkey’s Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, or at least unlike any Western leader, Putin is absolutely not restricted by the parliament; he’s absolutely not restricted by any other body.He can make decisions and realize these decisions immediately, and this makes it possible to concentrate all the might in one place very fast and to overplay the West, especially when it goes about the European Union, where decision making is taking too long, where all the countries should agree on something and so on.Putin is not restricted by all these democratic restrictions.

He can move fast and efficiently, and he does.

Absolutely.

And the world is abhorred.They jump back, sanctions are laid in, and the effect on Putin is what inside Russia?

I think that we should not overestimate Putin's strength inside Russia.First, in my view, the fact that the single base for the whole regime is not connected with institutions, with balance between different clans; it’s connected with Putin's popularity.It's a very risky thing, because if Putin is out, Putin's popularity is out, then there is absolute chaos, and nobody can foresee how it will develop in this case.

But another problem is connected with the fact that although Putin's popularity is extremely high, first we should not compare it to the popularity of any Western leader. It’s of a different kind.But not only it’s of a different kind, it's very fragile in the sense that if it will go down by say five percentage points and will reach 80 percent, which could be seen as a dream by any Western politician, it could cause a kind of an avalanche effect.So not only [does] Putin need to keep his popularity high, he needs to keep it high all the time without letting it go down, because immediately when it will start to go down, well, it can drop down. And that's the problem.

Another problem is connected with the so-called legitimacy trap, which means that OK, Putin bought 86 percent popularity in 2014 due to taking Crimea.The problem is that he cannot take anything else of similar importance in order to [maintain] this popularity.And unlike electoral legitimacy which you can restore winning in the next elections, in the case of a military chieftain’s legitimacy, you should prove to each and everybody that, a, you are in a besieged fortress and you need to consolidate around the leader, and b, you are strong enough to play the role of this leader, which pushes Putin into the direction of further confrontation, at least in rhetorical sense.

How to transfer to electoral popularity from military chieftain’s popularity, it’s another serious problem.²

You know, in Russia, it’s well understood that when drinking, you should not decrease the strength of drinks.After drinking beer, you should switch to vodka, but not in opposite way.Switching from chieftain’s legitimacy to electoral legitimacy is the same as to switch to beer after vodka. It can have a very dangerous effect.That's why it’s not that easy for Putin to do this, and that's why even now we do not know from him, at least, whether he is going to participate in the next presidential elections.

To imagine that he is winning elections in a way he did in 2012, it makes him a weak chieftain rather than a strong elected leader.In my view, there are only two ways out for him.One is to back any other candidate in these elections but not to run personally, or another option is to transfer elections into a kind of plebiscite when offering some very attractive program, letting Russians to vote not for Putin chosen among other competitors, but for Putin as the single and the real leader of the country.

Intervention in the U.S. Election

Into this mix we drop the 2016 American presidential election, where, in short order in the summer last year, … the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency seriously believe that the Russians have hacked the election; that over the months, the idea of fake news being initiated from here, the Internet trolls rolling in, beyond fake news, just other things.Whether it was decisive or not was not really the point, but that Russia was involved and that Putin initiated it becomes a charge that is leveled at him and indirectly at Russia.How does that wash, play, here in Russia?

I think it played very positive role for Putin.As I did try to explain, he needs to keep his military chieftain’s legitimacy. One way is to exploit his former victories.That's why a year after Crimea, in 2015, Putin did [produce] a movie telling us about his personal huge role.That's why next year elections should take place the same day Crimea has been taken, to remind each and every [person about] Putin's personal contribution.

The other way is to demonstrate that not only he's taken seriously, everybody is speaking about Putin's or Kremlin’s huge role every way, including in America, in French, in German elections.I would say the publicity of these discussions did play very positive role for Putin because it did demonstrate to ordinary Russians that, the United States being the strongest and the most developed country in the world, are afraid of Putin and his role and his interference, and Putin is deciding the fate of American elections.Whether it’s proved or not is another story, but the very fact that Putin is seen as the real threat for the American democracy is taken as a sign of Putin's greatness and of Russia's greatness as well.

So it can't go bad for him?

Yes, but let’s not forget about the fact that he’s staying in power for 17 years, and there are very different moments in his political life.All the time, he was capable to wait until something good for him would happen.

And is this that something?

… I think that Putin is sure that he’s kissed by the god, and this means that what he is doing is [a] very important mission.

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